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Abstract 
 
 There have been a variety of studies investigating the relative importance of structural change and 
real intensity change to the change in China’s energy consumption in the 1980s. However, no detailed 
analysis to date has been done to examine whether or not the increased energy efficiency trend in the 1980s 
still prevailed in the 1990s. This article has filled this gap by investigating the change in energy 
consumption in China’s industrial sector in the 1990s, based on the data sets of value added and end-use 
energy consumption for the 29 industrial subsectors and using the newly proposed decomposition method 
of giving no residual. Our results clearly show that the overwhelming contributor to the decline in industrial 
energy use in the 1990s was the decline in real energy intensity, indicating that the trend of real energy 
intensity declines in the 1980s at the 2-digit level was still maintained in the 1990s. This conclusion still 
holds even if we lower the growth rate dramatically in line with the belief that the growth rate of China’s 
GDP may be overestimated. 
 
 
JEL classification: Q43; Q48 
 
 
Keywords: China, energy, structural change, energy intensity change 
 
 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
 Since launching its open-door policy and economic reform in late 1978, China has experienced 
spectacular economic growth, with its gross domestic product (GDP) growing at the average annual rate of 
about 9.7% over the period 1980-2000. In the meantime, by implementing a series of policies and measures 
towards energy conservation (Zhang, 2000), China has cut its energy consumption per unit of GDP by 
about three quarters since 1980 (or in half since 1990) (see Figure 1). This achievement corresponds to an 
income elasticity of energy consumption of 0.34 and to an annual saving rate of 5.25% (Calculated based 
on the data from State Statistical Bureau (2002)). As shown in Table 1, most developing countries at 
China’s income level have the income elasticity of energy consumption well above one, suggesting that 
their energy consumption grows much faster than does the GDP.1 This clearly indicates that China’s 
achievement is rarely accomplished in countries at this level of development. 
 
Table 1 
Growth rates of GDP and energy consumption, and the income elasticity of energy consumption among 
different economies, 1980-1994 
 
 Annual growth 
of GDP (%) 
Annual growth of 
energy consumption (%) 
Income elasticity of 
energy consumption 
Low-income economies * 
    China 
    India 
Upper-middle-income economies 
High-income economies 
2.5 
11.0 
5.2 
2.5 
2.8 
3.3 
4.5 
6.3 
3.9 
1.1 
1.32 
0.41 
1.21 
1.56 
0.39 
 
* Excluding China and India. 
Source: Zhang (2000). 
                                                          
1 The income elasticity of energy consumption is defined as the change in energy consumption divided by 
the change in economic growth. As shown in Table 1, the income elasticity of energy consumption in 
China is quite low by international standards. In addition to energy conservation, there might be other three 
possible explanations. First, the growth rate of China’s GDP is overestimated, as discussed in the later 
section. Second, the growth of energy consumption is underestimated. China’s primary energy production 
and consumption statistics are usually revised in the year after their first appearance. In the widely 
publicized nationwide campaign to close down small coal mines, it is likely that even the revised coal 
production statistics may undercount actual coal output, thus leading to not fully counting the “missing 
supply” in China’s statistics on coal consumption as a result of re-opening the closed mines (Sinton, 2001; 
U.S. Embassy in China, 2001). Third, quantitative restrictions have kept energy consumption from rising as 
would otherwise have occurred (Zhang, 2000). Drawing on the analysis of rationing by Neary and Roberts 
(1980), the quantitative restrictions act like an implicit energy tax levied at rates varying with use and fuel. 
Generally speaking, households face a higher implicit tax than industrial users, and oil and natural gas are 
taxed at a higher rate than coal.  
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Figure 1 
Energy intensity of China’s GDP measured in tons of coal equivalent (tce) per US$ 1000 in 1980 prices 
Sources: Drawn based on the data from State Statistical Bureau (1992, 1998b, 2002). 
  
 The question then arises of what are the causes of this fall in energy use. Published work on this 
topic has expressed dissenting views. Based on the input-output tables in 1981 and 1987 for China, Lin and 
Polenske (1995) conducted a structural decomposition analysis to explain China’s energy use changes 
between 1981 and 1987. They found that, relative to 1981, all the energy savings in China in 1987 can be 
attributed to energy efficiency improvements. Based on China’s input-output tables in 1987 and 1992 and 
using the procedure similar to that used by Lin and Polenske, Garbaccio et al. (1999) concluded that the fall 
in energy use during 1987-92 was due mostly to a fall in real energy intensity. Using a Laspeyres 
decomposition method and based on three different sets of energy consumption and gross output value 
data, Sinton and Levine (1994) examined the relative roles of structural shift and real intensity change in 
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China’s industrial sector between 1980 and 1990. They found that real intensity change accounted for 85% 
of the country’s overall industrial intensity change for the period 1980-90. In contrast with the above 
studies suggesting that such a fall in energy use has been attributed mainly to the decline in real energy 
intensity, Smil (1990) and Kambara (1992) have argued that structural shifts away from more energy-
intensive industrial subsectors to less energy-intensive industrial ones have been the major causal factor. 
 To ascertain the relative importance of structural change and intensity change is important not 
only because it provides policy makers with the energy impact of the policies that have been implemented, 
but also because a good understanding of this issue helps to improve the credibility of future projections for 
energy demand and energy-related emissions. This article aims to examine this disagreement by 
investigating the relative importance of structural change and real intensity change to the change in energy 
consumption in China’s industrial sector. There are at least two reasons for choosing the industrial sector 
for our study. First, in China, industry is the dominant energy-consuming sector. As shown in Figure 2, 
although on average 40.6% of China’s GDP originated from the industrial sector from 1990 to 2000, it 
accounted for as high as 67.8% of the country’s total end-use energy consumption. Because the industrial 
sector is critical for the past and future energy consumption, a deeper understanding of how energy 
consumption evolves in the sector is very important in formulating future policy. Second, the data at fine 
level of disaggregation are available for the sector. This makes it possible to calculate how much of the fall 
in the total industrial energy use is due to structural shifts within the subsectors and how much to changes 
in real energy intensity. 
 This study differs from previous analyses in two important aspects. First, previous work examined 
the relative contributions of structural change and real intensity change to energy savings in the 1980s or 
between 1987 and 1992, while our study examines their relative importance in the 1990s to see whether or 
not the increased energy efficiency trend in the 1980s still prevailed in the 1990s. Second, we have 
proposed a decomposition method different from the Laspeyres method or Divisia method commonly used 
by previous work. This proposed method gives no residual so that all of the observed change in industrial 
energy consumption can be explained. 
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Figure 2 
Shares of the industrial sector in China’s GDP and total end-use energy consumption 
Sources: Drawn based on the data from State Statistical Bureau (1992, 1998b, 2001, 2002). 
 
 
 This article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the method to decompose the 
contributions of economic growth, structural change and real intensity change to the change in total energy 
consumption. Section 3 discusses the data used. Section 4 applies the decomposition method to analyse the 
changes in energy consumption in China’s industrial sector from 1990 to 1997 and presents the results from 
such a analysis. Section 5 tests the sensitivity of the results to the adjustment of the output data. Finally, 
Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Decomposition method 
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Let Eo and Et be total energy consumption in the industrial sector in year o and year t. The change 
in total industrial energy consumption between the two years, ΔEtot = Et – Eo, is decomposed as follows: 
 
REEEE strouttot +Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ int  
 
The first term ΔEout on the right-hand side represents a change in energy consumption due to a 
change in aggregate production (output effect). The second term ΔEstr represents a change in energy 
consumption due to changes in composition of aggregate production (structural effect). If less energy-
intensive industrial subsectors grow faster than do more energy-intensive industrial ones, such a structural 
change will put the downward pressure on energy demand, thus resulting in lower growth rate of energy 
consumption than would otherwise have been the case. The third term ΔEint shows a change in energy 
consumption due to changes in subsectoral energy intensities (intensity effect). Real energy intensity may 
decline as a result of the adoption of more efficient production technologies and energy management 
techniques, changes in product mix within and between subsectors, changes in product value as well as 
changes in the quality and mix of material and fuel inputs. This is the reason why we refer this effect to the 
intensity effect rather than the technological effect because it contains more than purely technological 
changes. The last term is a residual. 
In decomposing the change in overall energy consumption, the Laspeyres method has been used 
extensively.2 Proposed by Park (1992), the method calculates changes in energy consumption with respect 
to a constant base year and has the following components: 
 
∑∑ −=−=Δ
i
oioiotooioi
i
tout IsQQEIsQE ,,,, )(  
 ∑∑ −=−=Δ
i
oioitiootiti
i
ostr IssQEIsQE ,,,,, )(  
                                                          
2 The Laspeyres method and Divisia method are the two most commonly used decomposition methods. 
Studies that employed either of the two methods include Ang and Lee (1994), Boyd et al. (1987), Boyd et 
al. (1988), Howarth et al. (1991), and Liu et al. (1992). Howarth et al. (1991) show that the two methods of 
decomposing manufacturing energy use in eight OECD countries yield very similar results in terms of the 
relative importance of the driving force of aggregate energy intensity declines. 
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where Qo and Qt are aggregate production in the industrial sector in year o and year t, si,o and si,t are the ith 
industrial subsector’s share of aggregate production in year o and year t, and Ii,o and Ii,t are energy intensity 
in each industrial subsector i in year o and year t. 
The Laspeyres method is more easily interpreted. But the disadvantage of the method is that there 
is a residual, which is not equal to zero and generally increases as t increases (Howarth et al., 1991). This 
leaves part of the observed change in industrial energy consumption unexplained. For this reason, we 
propose a different decomposition method. By keeping the definition of the first term unchanged but 
redefining the last two terms, this proposed method is as easily interpreted as the Laspeyres method, but 
gives no residual. 
In what follows, we start describing the proposed method by defining ΔEstr to represent a 
difference between what energy consumption would have been if each subsectoral output at year t had been 
produced at the energy intensity of year o and that if the aggregate production at year t had been composed 
in the same way at year t as at year o and had been produced at the energy intensity of year o. Define ΔEint 
to represent a difference between the observed energy consumption and what energy consumption would 
have been if each subsectoral output at year t had been produced at the energy intensity of year o. Thus, we 
have 
  
 ∑∑ −=−=Δ
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 The proposed decomposition method gives no residual on the right-hand side. This can be 
illustrated as follows. Summing over the three terms, we have 
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3. Sector disaggregation and data 
 
 The choice for a level of sector disaggregation is mainly dictated by the purpose of analysis and 
data availability. Ideally, the fine level of subsectoral detail is desirable in order to accurately disentangle 
the structural effect from the intensity effect. Sinton and Levine (1994) shows that as the level of 
subsectoral detail becomes finer, more intensity change becomes attributable to structural shift. Given that 
the effect of changes in product mix within and between subsectors is counted as the intensity effect, this 
should thus come as no surprise because a finer level of sector disaggregation is able to more accurately 
separate the effect from the intensity effect. But, in practice, the desire for a finer level of sector 
disaggregation is often restrained by data availability. This is certainly the case in China where the data for 
industrial value added and energy use are at roughly the 2-digit industry classification level. 
 Unlike Huang (1993) and Sinton and Levine (1994) where gross output value is used as the output 
indicator, value added is used as the output indicator for this present study in order to avoid double 
accounting the value of intermediate goods.3 The data for value added in the industrial sector are 
disaggregated into 40 subsectors for the period 1991-92 and into 39 subsectors in 1999, the latest year in 
which detailed end-use energy consumption data in a consistent manner are available. The data for end-use 
energy consumption are disaggregated into 31 subsectors for the period 1991-96 and into 39 subsectors for 
                                                          
3 Gross output value measures all the output of the economy, regardless of to whom it is sold. Gross output 
value includes significant double accounting, because it reports output at every stage of production. For 
example, rubber is reported not only as rubber output, but also as part of tire output. It is again reported as 
part of bicycle output. There are two ways to avoid this double accounting in national accounts. One way is 
to measure value added to calculate only the new value that is added to the materials and services 
purchased as inputs. Another way is to measure final expenditures by reporting only what is ultimately sold 
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the period 1997-99. For each subsector, the total end-use energy consumption is the sum of the standard 
coal equivalents of coal, oil, natural gas, hydropower and nuclear power consumed. Because the energy 
consumption data are not compatible with such an industrial subsector classification, reconciling the 
differences between the two data sets obliges us to disaggregate the industrial sector into 29 subsectors. 
 For the years from 1991 to 1997, the data for value added at current prices for all independent 
accounting units at or above the township level in the industrial sector are collected and reported in the 
Chinese statistical yearbook. But from 1998 onwards, the data for value added at current prices are reported 
for all state-owned industrial enterprises plus the non-state-owned industrial enterprises with an annual 
sales revenue of over 5 million yuan (about US$ 0.6 million).4 This change in the scope of enterprises 
covered in industrial statistics makes the data set for 1991-97 incomparable with the data set for 1998-99. 
To be consistent in data set, we are forced to only cover the period 1991-97 for our comparative data 
analysis. The corresponding yearly data for value added at current prices and energy consumption in each 
subsector are taken from the Chinese State Statistical Bureau (1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 
2001). 
 In this study, we use 1991 as the base year. Price indices from 1991 to 1997 are disaggregated into 
14 subsectors and are derived from the Chinese State Statistical Bureau (1998c). Because price indices are 
less disaggregated than the value added data, in converting 29-subsector value added at current prices into 
that in 1990 constant prices, the same price index is thus used for those subsectors that are further 
disaggregated from the same higher-level subsector. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for household consumption, government consumption, new investment and net sales to the rest of the 
world. In principle, these two methods should lead to the same accounting results (Keidel, 2001).  
4 One of the major changes in industrial statistics since 1998 has been the switch from compiling detailed 
statistics on enterprises identified by an administrative criterion (located at or above the township level) to 
enterprises that exceed a fixed volume of sales revenue. This change makes it impossible to construct 
comparable time series data in the industrial sector using officially published industrial statistics. In 
addition, such a change into the size criterion has at least three implications. First, although all state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) with independent accounting units are still included, non-SOEs with independent 
accounting units at or above the township level but with sales revenue of less than 5 million yuan are now 
excluded from the detailed industrial statistics. In the meantime, enterprises at the village level that meet 
the two requirements are now included. Second, all self-employed individuals, who were previously 
excluded from the detailed statistics through the administrative criterion, are now explicitly excluded, 
regardless of their size. Third, given that those enterprises included through the size criterion are likely to 
have trained accountants and more reliable bookkeeping, the change in the scope of coverage may improve 
the accuracy and reliability of the data collected and reported (Holz and Lin, 2001). 
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 4. The relative importance of structural change and intensity change 
 
 In this section, we will apply the above proposed decomposition method to analyse the changes in 
energy consumption in China’s industrial sector from 1990 to 1997.  
 In the 1990s, the industrial sector experienced spectacular growth. Accompanying the growth, the 
cumulative energy consumption in the industrial sector between 1991 and 1997 would increase by 2147.03 
million tons of coal equivalent (Mtce), as shown in Table 2, provided that the production structure and 
energy intensity had remained unchanged. But, the actual cumulative energy consumption in the industrial 
sector during the period increased only by 1066.58 Mtce. Clearly, it is energy conservation that pushed the 
energy consumption during the period under review downward. Measured as the difference between the 
would-be and actual energy consumption, the accumulative energy savings between 1991 and 1997 
amounted to 1080.45 Mtce. 
 
Table 2 
Changes in the cumulative industrial energy consumption from 1990 to 1997 (Mtce)a 
 
Due to change in 
aggregate production 
Due to change in 
production structure 
Due to change in 
energy intensity 
Actual change in 
cumulative energy 
consumption 
+2147.03 -132.16 -948.29 +1066.58 
 
a A positive sign indicates an increase in energy consumption; a negative sign indicates a decline. 
 
 With respect to the breakdown of the contributions, our results show that 948.29 Mtce or 87.8% of 
the cumulative industrial energy savings for the period 1990-97 were attributed to real intensity change. 
Because this study and the above cited studies for the 1980s all use data at roughly the 2-digit industry 
classification level, this dominant role of intensity change clearly indicates that the trend of real energy 
intensity declines in the 1980s at the 2-digit level was still maintained in the 1990s.  
 Figure 3 shows the results in more subsectoral detail. The lengths of the bars are in proportion to 
changes in cumulative energy consumption by each industrial subsector, with a negative sign indicating the 
contributions to energy savings and a positive sign indicating the increase in energy consumption. 
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Figure 3 
Changes in cumulative end-use energy consumption by each industrial subsector from 1991 to 1997 
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Table 3 
Each industrial subsector’s shares of total value added and cumulative end-use energy consumption from 
1991 to 1997  
 
 Average share 
of total 
industrial 
value added 
(%) 
Share of 
cumulative 
end-use energy 
consumption 
(%) 
Coal mining and dressing  
Petroleum and natural gas extraction   
Ferrous metals mining and dressing    
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing 
Nonmetal and other minerals mining and dressing  
Logging and transport of wood and bamboo   
Food, beverage and tobacco processing   
Textile industry   
Garments and other fiber products    
Leather, furs, down and related products   
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm & straw products 
Furniture manufacturing 
Papermaking and paper products    
Printing and record medium reproduction   
Cultural, educational and sports articles   
Petroleum processing and coking  
Raw chemical materials and chemical products 
Medical and pharmaceutical products   
Chemical fiber   
Rubber products   
Plastic products   
Nonmental mineral products 
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals   
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals   
Metal products   
Machinery, electric equipment, electronic & other manufacturing 
Electric power, steam and hot water production and supply 
Gas production and supply 
Tap water production and supply 
3.43 
5.08 
0.29 
0.66 
0.97 
0.65 
11.54 
6.84 
2.29 
1.23 
0.66 
0.40 
1.52 
0.92 
0.57 
3.03 
6.17 
1.94 
1.27 
1.11 
1.64 
6.11 
7.18 
1.82 
2.72 
22.96 
6.42 
0.07 
0.50 
4.06 
2.98 
0.39 
0.59 
0.71 
0.27 
4.84 
4.04 
0.31 
0.26 
0.42 
0.14 
2.43 
0.21 
0.09 
4.37 
18.38 
1.14 
1.33 
0.77 
0.64 
14.78 
18.60 
3.26 
1.19 
8.10 
4.94 
0.25 
0.54 
 
Sources: Calculated based on the data from State Statistical Bureau (1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998a, 
1998b, 1998c, 2001). 
 
As shown in Table 3, within the industrial sector, the chief energy using subsectors are ferrous 
metals, chemicals, nonmental mineral products, and machinery. Between 1991 to 1997, the four subsectors 
consumed 18.6%, 18.4%, 14.8% and 8.1% (59.9% in total) of the total end-use energy consumption in the 
industrial sector, respectively. From Figure 3, it can be seen that the machinery subsector exhibited the 
greatest reduction in energy consumption, accounting for 28.4% of the total reduction in industrial energy 
consumption due to decline in real energy intensity during the period 1991-97. Such a reduction is a result 
of the combined effects of decline in real energy intensity and the largest share (23% on average) of the 
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subsector in the total industrial output (see Table 3). This is followed by the nonmental mineral products, 
chemicals, and ferrous metals subsectors. Real intensity declines in the last three subsectors contributed to 
26.3%, 15.3% and 10.2% of the above total reduction. With 80.2% of the total occurring in the four 
subsectors, it is fair to say that real intensity declines in the four subsectors had kept industrial energy 
consumption from rising to 2147.03 Mtce as would otherwise have occurred. 
 
 
5. The effects of an alternative lower growth rate 
 
 The credibility of China’s statistics on economic growth has been an issue of concern for decades. 
It has been widely argued that China’s statistical authorities underestimate China’s GDP level and thus 
overestimate the GDP growth rate. Using a measurement technique closer to Western national accounting 
practice, Maddison (1997), for example, re-estimates China’s GDP. He found that during the period 1952-
1978 China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.4%, in comparison with the official rate of 6%. For 
the period 1978-1994, his estimate for the GDP growth rate is 7.4%, whereas the official growth figure is 
9.8%. With China’s statistical system switching from the Soviet Material Product System to the System of 
National Accounts in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the officially reported growth rate of GDP is expected 
to be close to the real growth rate. But some analysts (e.g., Rawski, 2001) have argued that the official 
growth rates in the 1990s even further deviated from the real growth rates. For example, Wang and Meng 
(2001) found that China’s official GDP growth rate may have been overstated by 3.2% for the period 1992-
97, in comparison with the overstatement amounting to 1.3% for the period 1978-1991. Although the 
technical difficulties in statistical practices have played a part, they have argued the widespread 
falsification and exaggeration have been the major causal factor. On the other hand, in the recent interviews 
with Dr. Xu Xianchun5 and Prof. Ren Ruoen,6 the two authoritative persons, respectively inside and 
outside the National Bureau of Statistics, have defended that China’s GDP statistics basically reflect the 
                                                          
5 “Are China’s GDP Statistics Credible? Interview with Xu Xianchun at the National Bureau of Statistics”, 
Southern Weekends, 1 August 2002, Available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20020801/1206239196.html. 
6 “The Authoritative Scholar Questions: Are Rawski’s Assumptions about China’s GDP Rational?”, 
Financial Times, 14 May 2002, Available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20020514/206472.html. 
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real situation of economic development, although they recognize the need to further improve the present 
statistical system.  
 To test the sensitivity of the above results to the output value, we lower the annual growth rate of 
GDP by 2% from 1991 to 1997. Provided that its share in GDP remains unchanged, the annual growth rate 
of each industrial subsector accordingly reduces by 2%.7 As would be expected from the assumed slow 
down of economic growth, the cumulative increases in energy consumption in the industrial sector between 
1991 and 1997 would drop from 2147.03 Mtce in the above case of the high GDP growth rate to 1721.59 
Mtce, as given in Table 4. Given the fact that the actual cumulative energy consumption in the industrial 
sector during the period remained unchanged, this implies that, in absolute terms, the cumulative 
contribution of energy conservation, which amounted to 655.01 Mtce,  would be less than 1080.45 Mtce in 
the above case of the high GDP growth rate. In percentage terms, however, 82.1% of the cumulative energy 
savings in the industrial sector for the period 1990-97 were attributed to real intensity change. This clearly 
indicates that our above finding on the relative importance of structural change and real intensity change to 
the change in energy consumption in China’s industrial sector is fairly robust to the adjustment of the 
output data. 
 
Table 4 
Changes in the cumulative industrial energy consumption associated with a lower GDP growth rate from 
1990 to 1997 (Mtce)a 
 
Due to change in 
aggregate production 
Due to change in 
production structure 
Due to change in 
energy intensity 
Actual change in 
cumulative energy 
consumption 
+1721.59 -117.47 -537.54 +1066.58 
 
a A positive sign indicates an increase in energy consumption; a negative sign indicates a decline. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
                                                          
7 There is a wide suspicion that the official rate of inflation for producer prices is understated because the 
official prices might not be the properly weighted average of plan and market prices, might have been 
misreported, or were not produced using a good sample of firms (Rawski, 1991; Garbaccio et al., 1999). 
Assuming that the official data for GDP and industrial subsector value added are correct, lowering the 
annual growth rate of each industrial subsector by 2% is equivalent to raising the annual rate of inflation of 
all industrial products by the same percentage in terms of the impacts on the energy consumption, although 
the reasons for the two adjustments are very different from each other. 
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  By implementing a series of policies and measures towards energy conservation, China has cut its 
energy consumption per unit of GDP by about three quarters since 1980 (or in half since 1990). In the 
literature of examining the causes of this fall in energy use in the 1980s, however, there seems to be 
dissenting view. Some analysts believe that such a fall has been attributed mainly to the decline in real 
energy intensity, whereas others think that structural shifts away from more energy-intensive industrial 
subsectors to less energy-intensive industrial ones have been the major causal factor. 
 Based on the data sets of value added and end-use energy consumption for the 29 industrial 
subsectors and using our proposed decomposition method of giving no residual, we have examined this 
disagreement by investigating the relative importance of structural change and real intensity change to the 
change in energy consumption in China’s industrial sector in the 1990s. Our results show that 88% of the 
cumulative energy savings in the industrial sector for the period 1990-97 were attributed to real intensity 
change, with about 80% of such savings from the four chief energy using subsectors (i.e., ferrous metals, 
chemicals, nonmental mineral products and machinery). Because this study and the cited studies for the 
1980s all use data at roughly the 2-digit industry classification level, this dominant role of intensity change 
clearly indicates that the trend of real energy intensity declines in the 1980s at the 2-digit level was still 
maintained in the 1990s. 
 Finally, to test the robustness of the above conclusion, we have lowered the annual growth rate of 
each industrial subsector by 2% in line with the belief that the growth rate of China’s GDP may be 
overestimated. It is clear from this sensitivity analysis that our conclusion that the major contributor to the 
decline in industrial energy use in the 1990s was the decline in real energy intensity does not change even if 
the growth slows down dramatically. 
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